Public controversy over contacts between political leaders and the Constitutional Court raises an institutional question: if a constitutional judge is suspected of discussing a matter falling within the Court’s jurisdiction with political representatives, who establishes what happened and who can impose a sanction?
Under the Romanian framework, disciplinary investigation is conducted by other Constitutional Court judges and the final internal decision belongs to the Court’s Plenum. The position is particularly sensitive when the subject is the Court president. The legal analysis concerns the institutional framework and does not establish misconduct by any person mentioned in the original Romanian commentary.
An institutional meeting is not itself misconduct
Law no. 47/1992 expressly gives the president responsibility for representing the Court before public authorities and other organisations. The president coordinates its work, convenes and chairs meetings and performs administrative functions. Legitimate discussions about budgets, administration or institutional cooperation are therefore not prohibited.
The content of a meeting matters. Giving advice on constitutionality, discussing the outcome of a pending or foreseeable case or helping develop a strategy on a matter the judge may later decide raises different questions. Clarifying the meeting’s purpose allows legitimate dialogue to be distinguished from possible breaches of judicial obligations.
What the law requires
Article 64 requires impartiality and respect for the Constitution. It prohibits public positions or advice on matters within the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction and requires abstention from activities inconsistent with the independence and dignity of the office.
The prohibition is not confined to disclosure of deliberations or overt pressure. A judge who may decide a constitutional issue should not first advise a political authority on how to structure the same issue or avoid constitutional objections. Public confidence also depends on the appearance of meaningful separation from the authorities whose acts the Court reviews.
A recurring institutional issue
The Romanian article discusses reports about a February 2024 Cotroceni meeting attended by Judge Mihaela Ciochină during debate over combining local and European Parliament elections. It also records that an AUR deputy submitted a disciplinary complaint. Press reports and a complaint do not establish what was discussed or prove a disciplinary offence.
A further example concerns the February 2026 controversy over Prime Minister Ilie Bolojan’s letter to Court President Simina Tănăsescu about a reported EUR 231 million recovery-plan funding risk in connection with judicial pension reform. The High Court president criticised what she considered pressure, while the Government described the communication as factual information without a request for a particular ruling. The original article presents these competing interpretations, not a finding of improper influence.
Such episodes show why the boundary between institutional information and perceived pressure matters independently of the particular officials or parties involved.
The Plenum has exclusive disciplinary competence
Law no. 47/1992 assigns determination of disciplinary offences, sanctions and their application exclusively to the Constitutional Court’s Plenum. The Judicial Inspection, Superior Council of Magistracy, Ministry of Justice, Government and Parliament do not decide this special disciplinary procedure.
Internal competence protects judges from political retaliation for unwelcome decisions. It also raises a legitimate question about the effectiveness and transparency of an institution examining its own members.
The procedure under the 2025 regulation
The regulation approved by Plenum Decision no. 5 of 30 January 2025 replaced the 2012 regulation. Judges are protected against legal liability for opinions and votes expressed when deciding cases, but serious and culpable breaches of Article 64 may attract disciplinary liability.
A written, signed complaint is required. For a complaint against a judge, the president appoints a three-judge investigative commission. If the complaint concerns the president, the Plenum selects its three members by drawing lots. The president under investigation therefore does not choose the investigators.
The investigation ordinarily takes 30 days, extendable by up to another 30. The judge is summoned and may raise a defence and propose evidence. The commission reports to the Plenum, recommending closure if it considers the complaint unfounded or forwarding the case if it considers it substantiated. The commission cannot independently impose a sanction or finally close the matter.
Why the president’s position matters
The president does not have a superior judicial vote. Administratively, however, the office coordinates the institution, convenes and chairs meetings and performs important allocation, scheduling and representation functions. Colleagues may thus have to investigate and decide a case concerning the person who leads the institution’s administration.
This does not justify presuming those judges biased. It does make appearances of impartiality a legitimate procedural concern.
The Venice Commission’s analysis
The December 2024 Venice Commission report on disciplinary accountability of constitutional court presidents and judges discusses protection from political influence alongside the problems created by a small bench. The same judge may otherwise participate in initiating, investigating and deciding a disciplinary case.
Excluding everyone involved at an earlier stage may make a court of seven or nine judges unable to meet quorum requirements. The difficulty cannot simply be wished away. The president is generally first among equals with administrative and representative responsibilities rather than superior judicial authority. These are structural questions shared by constitutional jurisdictions.
Sanctions and external review
The Romanian regulation provides for a warning, reduction of gross monthly remuneration by up to 15% for one to three months, or termination of the judicial mandate in the most serious cases. A sanction is adopted by a majority vote of the judges. The special procedure does not currently prescribe a two-thirds majority for termination.
A sanctioned judge may challenge the Plenum’s decision within 15 days of communication before the High Court’s five-judge panel. Its judgment is final and the challenge suspends enforcement of the sanction.
The regulation does not provide, in the same disciplinary chapter, an equivalent express appeal for the complainant against closure of the case. The special external safeguard is therefore framed primarily as protection against an unjustified sanction. This observation concerns that special procedure and does not claim to resolve every possible question of access to a court.
Possible reforms
The original analysis proposes safeguards while retaining protection from political control. These are proposals for future legislation, not a description of existing duties:
- A public register of institutional meetings with political authorities, recording the date, participants, capacities and general subject while preserving legally confidential information.
- Documentation of contacts concerning matters likely to reach the Court, so relevant information is not informally channelled to only one judge without a traceable record.
- Reasoned publication of disciplinary outcomes in matters of public interest, subject to confidentiality requirements.
- Clear incompatibility rules for investigators participating in the final decision, exclusion of the subject judge from deciding their own case and express rules on quorum.
- A qualified majority for termination of a mandate, providing added protection against political or temporary internal majorities.
- Limited external review of closure decisions, focused on whether the complaint was effectively examined, relevant evidence considered and reasons given. This proposal would require careful examination against the Plenum’s exclusive competence under Article 65 of Law no. 47/1992. It would not give political bodies power to decide whether a judge committed misconduct.
Giving political bodies disciplinary control would create serious independence risks. The more useful question is whether the internal process offers enough transparent and impartial safeguards for public confidence. The existence of an institutional meeting alone proves no breach. When a credible concern arises, however, the procedure for examining it should inspire confidence as well as protect independence.
See also raising a constitutional challenge in criminal proceedings. This is legal commentary on the institutional framework, not political advocacy or an adjudication of individual allegations.