Final acquittal for influence peddling: why a flagrante operation does not, on its own, prove the offense

Results·16 April 2026·8 min·Rareș Rotaru

The Bucharest Court of Appeal set aside in full the conviction handed down at first instance against a former parliamentary adviser and ordered a final acquittal for influence peddling, holding that the offense did not exist. The court did not confine itself to the lawfulness of certain evidence: it examined the merits of the charge separately and found that no link had been proven between the loan received and an alleged promise to intervene.

At first sight, the case appeared to contain every element of a charge that is hard to contest — a denunciation, recorded conversations, the handing over of a sum of money and a staged flagrante delicto operation. At first instance, the Ilfov Tribunal read those circumstances as establishing the offense and imposed a suspended sentence of one year and four months.

On appeal, the Bucharest Court of Appeal examined the full sequence of the conversations, the prior relationship between the defendant and the reporting witness, the purpose for which the money had been handed over, and whether the elements required by law for corruption offenses were present. It allowed the appeal, quashed the judgment in full and ordered a final acquittal on the ground that the offense did not exist.

From fragmentary reading to the full context

A central plank of the defense was that the prosecution's account had been built by lifting statements out of the context in which they were made.

Before the flagrante operation, the defendant had asked the reporting witness for a loan to repair his car. Separately from that conversation, he had already recommended him within the political organisation — without having received any money and without any benefit having been promised to him. The recommendation had been made before the money changed hands and independently of it.

The defense argued that two distinct matters — a request for a loan on the one hand, and discussions about the witness's involvement in political activities on the other — had been merged into a single accusatory construction. The Court of Appeal returned to the actual chronology and examined whether the link required by the criminal provision existed between the benefit received and the alleged intervention. It found that no such link had been proven.

This distinction between a fragmentary reading and a complete analysis is decisive in cases built on recorded conversations. A statement examined in isolation may look incriminating; the same statement, read against the earlier discussions, the initiative of the participants and the whole sequence of events, may carry an entirely different legal meaning.

A flagrante delicto operation does not prove the offense

Such operations naturally produce a strong public impact. The image of a person receiving money, followed by the intervention of the judicial authorities, can create the impression that guilt is already established.

In reality, a flagrante operation captures a moment. It does not, in itself, establish the legal meaning of that moment. Even then, the court must examine the purpose for which the money was handed over, the earlier discussions, who raised the subject, and whether a promise to intervene existed.

In this case, it was the reporting witness who asked the defendant how much money he needed. The defendant stated the amount he was requesting as a loan and said he would repay it once the problems with his car were resolved. The court held that there was no direct link between the loan and any alleged unlawful conduct, and that merely receiving a sum of money as a loan was not sufficient to make out the charge.

Not every recommendation amounts to influence peddling

Influence peddling requires more than a relationship, a recommendation, or a claim that someone spoke in another's favour. The accused must promise to induce an official, or another person with relevant powers, to adopt a particular course of conduct. That promise may be express or may follow unequivocally from the circumstances, but it must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal held that the promise to induce a person with decision-making powers is an essential element of the offense, and found that the defendant had made no such promise.

An earlier recommendation, advice about involvement in the organisation's activities, or a statement that someone might be considered for future events does not automatically amount to a criminally relevant promise. Moreover, at the time of the discussions it was not settled that a further trip would take place, nor who would have had concrete powers over the selection of participants.

The court also examined the merits separately

In public commentary, the case was sometimes presented as though the defendant had benefited solely from the exclusion of evidence. That account does not reflect the full analysis carried out on appeal.

The court examined two distinct questions: the lawfulness of the investigative acts carried out by officers of the General Anticorruption Directorate, and the merits of the conviction. After addressing the first, it turned separately to the second and found that the tribunal had wrongly concluded that the defendant had committed the offense. It held that the essential circumstances forming the objective element of influence peddling could not be established beyond reasonable doubt, found a real and serious doubt as to the very existence of the offense, and applied the principle of in dubio pro reo.

Lawfulness of evidence as a safeguard

A finding that investigative acts are void is not an arbitrary advantage granted to the person under investigation. The body gathering evidence must be the one designated by law — jurisdiction determines who may conduct interviews, who may implement surveillance measures and who may carry out investigative acts. Where those rules are breached, the mechanism through which justice is administered is itself affected. See also our page on defense in anticorruption proceedings.

Lawfulness is not opposed to establishing the judicial truth. It is one of the conditions under which that truth can be established legitimately.

What follows from the final decision

The decision cannot be reduced to the claim that the defendant was acquitted only because evidence was excluded. The court found that merely receiving a sum as a loan did not prove influence peddling, that no direct link had been established between the benefit and any alleged unlawful intervention, that the recommendation had been made earlier and independently, and that no promise to induce a person with concrete powers had been proven.

Suspicion may justify opening an investigation. A flagrante operation may preserve a relevant moment. Only a complete analysis, lawfully obtained evidence and proof of every element of the offense can justify a conviction.

A comparable question on the standard of proof arose in the final acquittal in the Energy Holding case, an embezzlement matter of nearly 60 million lei.

Rareș Rotaru, Attorney at Law, Bucharest Bar

This article is for information purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Every case is different; past results are not a promise as to the outcome of any other case.

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